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This  paper  describes  and  analyses  current  poverty  and  income  distribution  in 
South Africa, with a central concern the relationship between poverty, inequality 
and growth. The paper also investigates patterns of and trends in poverty and 
income distribution, a literature with a long and distinguished history. Drawing 
from recent literature in this regard, the paper shows that the labour market – 
rather than access to wealth or to political and fiscal power – currently sets the 
limits to redistribution. Wage inequality, deeply rooted in South Africa’s history, 
plays a central role in overall income distribution, and patterns of human capital 
development are fundamental to the future growth path and therefore to poverty 
and income distribution. The paper therefore concludes that reducing inequality 
substantially is currently unlikely without a massive increase in the human capital 
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Current poverty and income distribution in the context of South African history 
Servaas van der Berg 
"(T)here is not one distribution of income but many: income is distributed across 
racial groups, income classes, present and future generations, and so on. Moreover, 
a given distribution is not a one-dimensional magnitude: it has as many dimensions 
or components as there are relevant ‘classes’." (Norman Bromberger, 1982, p.166) 
Introduction and background 
In South Africa with its high levels of racial inequality, inequality in income distribution is 
especially large and persistent. For an upper-middle income country (in terms of GDP per capita 
and economic structure), South African social indicators (e.g. life expectancy, infant mortality or 
quality of education) are closer to those of lower-middle income or even low income countries. 
This reflects the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities. A small group of high-
income  earners  sharply  increases  average  incomes,  but  has  little  impact  on  average  social 
indicators, which are low because of this very same inequality. Even in 1995, before the full 
advent of AIDS, South African life expectancy at birth was only 63 – ten years less than that of 
Panama, a country of comparable income, and four years less than that of the Philippines, a 
country with one-third of South Africa‟s per capita income (World Bank 1997).  
It is common to ascribe South African inequality and even poverty to racial discrimination and in 
particular to apartheid. This of course offers only a part of the explanation. In a poor pre-colonial 
society, colonial settlement and then the mineral discoveries laid the basis for a highly dualistic 
economy that was from the outset highly inegalitarian. Racial discrimination under first British 
colonial rule and then apartheid distributed the spoils of economic growth along racial lines, 
which laid the foundation for patterns of further development and privilege in a society stratified 
by race. The post-apartheid government implemented policies that explicitly tried to overturn 
these patterns of privilege.  
Against  this  background,  this  paper  describes  and  analyses  current  poverty  and  income 
distribution in South Africa. A central concern is the relationship between poverty, inequality 
and growth, dealt with in the next section. Subsequent sections investigate patterns of and trends 
in income distribution and poverty, a literature that has a long and distinguished history. In this 
brief summary of the most recent part of that literature, the paper will show that the labour 
market – rather than access to wealth or to political and fiscal power – currently sets the limits to 
redistribution. Wage inequality, deeply rooted in South Africa‟s history, plays a central role, and 
patterns of human capital development are fundamental to the future growth path and thereby to 
poverty and inequality. Therefore the conclusion is that substantially reducing inequality is now 
unlikely without a massive increase in the human capital of those presently poor; unfortunately, 
prospects in this regard are inauspicious. 4 
 
Income inequality, headcount poverty and growth 
For a given average income level of a country, high inequality usually can be associated with 
high levels of headcount poverty. The terms poverty and inequality are often intertwined, in a 
manner that suggests that these two factors are closely related. This is not necessarily true in a 
historical sense, as the association between inequality and poverty breaks down when average 
incomes are growing as a result of economic growth, when such growth is large and sustained 
over a substantial period. Even though rising inequality may prevent poverty from declining 
rapidly, the effect of rapid and long term economic growth is likely to dominate the inequality 
effect.  Most  developed  countries  today  probably  have  greater  income  inequality  yet  far less 
poverty than half a millennium ago, and the same probably applies to developing countries in the 
past 200 years. Maddison‟s path breaking quantitative estimates show per capita income of the 
African continent to have been about $420 in 1820, almost the same value as in A.D.1, when it 
was still close to the world average (Maddison 2007). Yet by 2000, average incomes of black 
South  Africans  were  perhaps  three  times  as  large  (depending  on  the  exchange  rate  used  to 
convert). Thus poverty had declined since early colonial times, though one may lament the slow 
rate of this decline. In contrast, there can be little doubt that there is now far greater inequality 
than before colonial settlement.   
But  even  in  the  short  run,  the  assumed  narrow  association  between  headcount  poverty  and 
inequality  does  not  always  hold.  Higher  inequality  could  increase  poverty,  or  reduce  it, 
depending where the poverty line is deemed to lie relative to the modal incomes in the income 
distribution. This can be illustrated as follows: Figure 1 shows kernel density curves of income 
distribution by race from IES2005. White incomes far exceed those of blacks and consequently 
lie to the right, with coloureds and Indians taking intermediate positions. There is limited overlap 
between white and black incomes. If a poverty line is selected, as illustrated by the vertical line 
on the left, to run approximately through the mode of the black income distribution, on this log 
scale, this would leave roughly half the black population in poverty. In such a situation, greater 
income inequality amongst blacks and the consequent widening of the density curve would have 
little effect on the black poverty headcount, i.e. the proportion of the population deemed to be 
poor, though it would affect poverty measures that are more sensitive to low incomes, such as the 
P1  measure (the poverty gap ratio) or  the P2 measure  (the poverty severity ratio or squared 
poverty gap ratio).
3 In this paper, as in much of the literature, reference to poverty is usually to 
headcount poverty as measured in money -metric terms, relative to some chosen poverty line. 
However, a more nuanced view of poverty, that also gives greater attention to Foster -Greer-
Thorbecke‟s P1 and P2 measures, is to be encouraged. Amongst other things, poverty measures 
                                                 
3 Po, P1 and P2 are three poverty measures used within the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) class of measures. P0, the poverty 
headcount ratio, is the most commonly used measure, but insensitive to the situation of the poor. P1, the poverty gap ratio, 
considers how far the poor are removed from the poverty line, while P2, the poverty severity ratio or squared poverty gap ratio, 
also considers distribution amongst the poor by weighting the poorest most heavily. Thus P1 and especially P2 are measures that 
are more sensitive to the position of the poorest. 5 
 
that are more sensitive to the position of the poorest are to be preferred because they are less 
sensitive to the choice of poverty line.
4 
A worsening income distribution within other population groups, reflected in a widening of their 
density curves, would place  more people below the poverty line. In such case s, the poverty 
headcount ratio and inequality would move in the same direction.  
A similar situation applies for the second vertical line, which can be regarded as either a poverty 
line set very high, or an affluence threshold. A worsening income distribution amongst blacks 
would move some people above the affluence  threshold (or out of poverty if the poverty line 
were set at such an inappropriately high level). That is precisely how the recent rise of the black 
middle class can be perceived:  growing inequality amongst blacks is associated with  growing 
numbers of people moving into higher income groups or into affluence. If a poverty line were set 
at such a level, worsening income distribution would have meant less rather than more headcount 
poverty.  
                                                 
4 Some contentious issues regarding the choice of both poverty line and poverty measure (P0, P1 or P2) can be avoided if first 
order stochastic poverty dominance can be demonstrated, i.e. if the ordering of the  poverty headcount remains unchanged 
irrespective of the poverty lines, in which case the same ordering would apply for any of the three FGT measures as well at any 
conceivable poverty line. Such dominance can be shown using cumulative density functions. Though much of the SA poverty 
measurement literature now takes cognisance of this, summaries of this literature in this paper largely relate to the poverty 




Thus, as a rule of thumb and for the reasons discussed, if the income poverty line lies to the left 
of  modal  incomes,  then  income  inequality  will  usually  worsen  headcount  poverty,  while  a 
poverty line above the mode means that increased inequality will push more people above the 
poverty line. 
To this  relationship between inequality and poverty needs  to  be  added the relationship  with 
growth. Economic growth shifts distributions to the right, thus poverty would decline unless 
income distribution worsens enough to counter this growth. Economic growth with unchanged 
income distribution would benefit all and reduce poverty. It is even possible – and probably also 
occurred for a period after the turn of the 21
st century – that income inequality can worsen while 
poverty substantially declines as a result of economic growth. The more growth there is, the less 
likely that growing inequality can prevent the beneficial effects of growth from reducing poverty. 
On the other hand, sharp increases in inequality can overturn the effect of even large growth 
episodes. Thus growth and trends in inequality jointly determine trends in poverty.  
South Africa‟s household income per person in 2010 in current Rand values was about R31 600, 
versus  approximately  R9 000  in  1910  measured  in  the  same  purchasing  power.
5  Over that 
century, then, per capita income had grown by about one and a quarter percent per annum, but 
                                                 
5 Author‟s own estimates based on published national accounts data and population estimates, and with some provision for 
changes in definitions used in the national accounts.  7 
 
due  to  the  power  of  compound  interest,  aggregate  growth  was  250%.  How  did  that  affect 
measured  poverty?  That  is  no  easy  question  answer,  but  a  small  simulation  exercise  will 
illustrate what the effect of this growth may have been under alternative scenarios regarding 
income distribution. 
Assume a log-normal distribution of income, which is indeed a close enough approximation for 
most income distributions and an assumption widely used in the literature.
6 Assume also that the 
Gini coefficient for 2010 was 0.72 (approximately the value obtained in 2007)
7  (a standard 
deviation of log-income set at about 1.522 generates such a Gini). The Gini coefficient for 1910 
must clearly have been lower. W e allow for four possibilities, ranging from 0.30 to 0.60 . To 
investigate the impact of growth and distribution on poverty requires setting a fixed poverty line, 
by the maxim “when you want to measure change, don‟t change the measure.” Similar to poverty 
lines  in  the  European  Union,  the  poverty  lines  chosen  for  this  exercise  were  about  60%  of 
median per capita income, viz. R6 000 per capita per year based on the 2010 distribution, and 
R2 600 for 1910 (for the case where the Gini has been set at 0.60).   
The results are presented below. For 1910, assumed Ginis were set to range from 0.30 to 0.60, 
while the income distribution for 2010 shows the much greater inequality South Africa now has. 
Table 1 illustrates that even a century of moderate economic growth may not necessarily reduce 
poverty,  if  inequality  rises  greatly  during  that  period.  This  is  particularly  true  for  poverty 
measures most sensitive to the position of the poorest, e.g. where the poverty line is set at a 
lower level, or where P1 and P2 are used rather than the headcount ratio, P0. For more moderate 
increases in inequality, the effect of growth is likely to dominate and poverty reduction is likely 
to accompany growth. 










Poverty line R6 000  Poverty line R3 600 
P0  P1  P2  P0  P1  P2 
2010  R31 600  0.72  0.3699  0.2022  0.1378  0.1888  0.0905  0.0567 
1910  R9 000 
0.30  0.3181  0.0865  0.0338  0.0222  0.0038  0.0011 
0.40  0.4339  0.1622  0.0817  0.0969  0.0256  0.0101 
0.50  0.5199  0.2451  0.1476  0.2051  0.0748  0.0379 
0.60  0.6018  0.3417  0.2354  0.3320  0.1556  0.0948 
Note: Shaded cases are those where measured poverty in 1910 was lower than in 2010 
                                                 
6 In a heated recent debate about trends in world poverty, this assumption of his was not really challenged, though many other 
assumptions of Sala-i-Martin‟s estimates were (see Sala-i-Martin 2002a, 2002b; Bourguignon & Morrisson 2002; Quah  2002). 
7 Many studies that record lower Gini coefficients use datasets that do not accurately capture some higher incomes. Some authors 
(e.g. the World Bank in its World Development Reports) report inequality in  household income, but the method employed 
throughout for these figures was to compare all individual incomes, thus weights were derived by multiplying household weights 
by the household size, as Deaton (1997) prescribes for such situations. 8 
 
So what was the case in South Africa over the past century? No data exists to give a definitive 
answer
8, but the great extent of racial inequality known to exist a century ago  (see e.g. Spandau 
1971) makes it likely that overall income distribution was already very unequal in 1910  (simply 
assuming equal within-group  incomes  and  applying  that  to  Spandau‟s  racial  income  share 
estimates for 1917 already gives a Gini of 0.53), though it undoubtedly grew further over the 
century. Thus one may suspect that the 1910 Gini coefficient, if measured in the same manner 
and with similar information as currently, may have been somewhere in the range 0.50 to 0.60, 
probably closer to the latter value. If this was indeed true, the poverty headcount must have 
declined considerably since Union using the higher poverty line: The headcount ratio has fallen 
by as much as 23 percentage points. But if a lower poverty line is considered, or when using 
poverty measures more sensitive to the position of the poorest, poverty may even have worsened 
if poverty inequality had risen from lower levels than assumed. South Africa‟s history of rising 
inequality  was  clearly  bad  for  poverty  reduction,  and  what  growth  there  was  may  not  have 
benefited the poorest much.  
Have trends improved in the more recent past? The next section investigates this issue. 
Income distribution and poverty: Understanding post-transition trends 
 
Data and measurement issues in South Africa 
Although recent years saw an explosion of data sources for estimating poverty and distribution 
trends, estimates remain greatly uncertain. Reasons include measurement difficulties (including 
data validity and comparability issues, differences in sampling frames, sample attrition and non-
response, changes in survey instruments and inconsistencies in how field workers interpret and 
apply  definitions);  that  different  surveys  and  censuses  classify  income  and  that  different 
researchers deal with missing values of income or recorded zero incomes in widely varying 
ways; and that respondents in many surveys are not sufficiently prompted to recall all possible 
income sources, thereby leading to under-reporting of income from various sources by varying 
degrees.  
To illustrate: The proportion of national accounts current income directly captured in the census 
(after imputations to deal with missing data) was only 42% in 1996, but rose to 65% in the 2001 
census and to 91% in the 2007 Community Survey (Yu 2009, 46). This renders comparisons 
across these data sources suspect. Similar issues arise with the Income and Expenditure Surveys: 
While  food  expenditure  values  in  earlier  surveys  was  obtained  though  respondent  recall, 
IES2005  implemented  a  weekly  diary  for  four  weeks,  giving  rise  to  respondent  fatigue, 
especially amongst higher income respondents.  Consequently, recorded food expenditure fell 
sharply from 18.3% to 9.6% of all expenditure, caused by an unlikely combination of a 14% 
                                                 
8 Whiteford and McGrath (1994: 15) point out that “Prior to 1979 no satisfactory attempts had been made at calculating how 
personal income was distributed among earners or households.” The first attempts to estimate such distribution were for 1970 
and subsequent years. 9 
 
recorded decline in real food expenditure and a 64% increase in recorded aggregate consumption 
expenditure  over  a  five  year  period  (Yu  2008,  16,  Table  10).  Data  comparisons  are  thus 
hazardous. This applies especially for income distribution estimates, as these are also sensitive to 
the accuracy of measurement of high incomes, including profits, dividends and other property 
income. Thus Charles Simkins (2000, 13) rightly reminds us that “The art of measurement lies in 
painstaking reconciliation of information (which is sometimes years in arrears), supplemented 
by the use of judgement. Up to now, the margin of error has been much wider than one would 
like, making estimates controversial.” 
Trends in inter-racial income distribution 
In 1971 Spandau (1971, 195) wrote that "The main distinguishable feature of the distribution of 
income by race is its relative constancy during the 35 year period 1924/25 to 1960." Despite a 
rising black population share, this stability in racial income shares continued until about 1970. 
However, between 1970 and the end of the century the black share of income increased sharply 
from 22% to 38% (Table 2 presents one set of estimates), bringing to an end a long period of 
widening racial income inequality.  
 
Table 2: Estimates of total and per capita income, 1970-2000 (in 2000 Rand values) 
  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
All income 
Blacks  R50 454m  R82 683m  R108 131m  R132 553m  R170 630m  R212 294m  R252 071m 
Coloureds  R17 513m  R20 999m  R23 854m  R29 436m  R36 784m  R44 417m  R53 111m 
Indians  R6 298m  R8 361m  R10 892m  R13 635m  R17 181m  R21 480m  R26 396m 
Whites  R151 963m  R189 279m  R211 504m  R235 605m  R260 835m  R277 411m  R326 307m 
Total  R226 228m  R301 321m  R354 381m  R411 230m  R485 429m  R555 601m  R657 884m 
Per capita income 
Blacks  R 3 134  R 4 479  R 5 107  R 5 423  R 6 008  R 6 704  R 7 283 
Coloureds  R 8 184  R 8 630  R 8 822  R 9 855  R 11 404  R 12 722  R 14 126 
Indians  R 9 595  R 11 244  R 13 296  R 15 113  R 17 637  R 20 592  R 23 938 
Whites  R 39 217  R 44 242  R 46 670  R 48 370  R 51 951  R 53 840  R 62 360 
Total  R 9 936  R 11 626  R 12 125  R 12 385  R 12 903  R 13 436  R 14 716 
Source: Van der Berg & Louw 2004, using estimates derived from a variety of sources 
The income of any group can be considered to consist of wages (the product of the average wage 
and  the  number  employed)  plus  income  from  assets  (i.e.  income  from  the  other  factors  of 
production, capital, land and entrepreneurship) plus income from social grants (transfers). The 
most important income components are wage levels, employment (relative to the size of the 
population) and social grants. The relationship can be written as: 
Y = W x E + Ya + Yg,               (Equation 1) 
and thus 
Y/P = W x E/P + Ya/P + Yg/P             (Equation 2) 10 
 
where Y is the income of a group, P is its population size, W the mean wage of that group, E the 
number employed, Ya is income from assets and Yg income from social grants. 
This can be interpreted in the following way: If the average wage W rises or the number of 
employed compared to the population (E/P) rises, then per capita income will increase, ceteris 
paribus. Asset income (Ya) for a particular group is less likely to change markedly in any short 
time span, as asset accumulation is a slow process. Grant incomes (Yg) can change more rapidly; 
in South Africa they have increased sharply in recent years. 
This conceptual framework facilitates an investigation of inter-group inequality trends in the 
post-1970 period, and most usefully it allows an analysis of trends in the per capita incomes of 
blacks, the numerically dominant group. The long stagnation of black wages on the mines and 
the slow progress in other sectors came to an abrupt end in the early 1970s, with a combination 
of gold price rises, union action and international pressure giving rise to rapid wage increases for 
this group (Van der Berg 1989a, 1989b). These wage rises moderated during the 1990s and 
slowed to only modest wage movements since, largely commensurate with skill and productivity 
improvements.  But  rising  unemployment  from  the  1970s  restricted  black  per  capita  income 
growth. Even though employment growth accelerated a little in the 1990s, this was not enough to 
keep  up  with  the  rapid  rise  in  labour  force  participation.  By  September  2009,  narrow 
unemployment  was  28.8  percent  for  blacks  against  4.6  percent  for  whites;  coloureds  (21.6 
percent) and Indians (12.7 percent) occupied intermediate positions. 
There were also some shifts in ownership of assets which generate income (dividends and land 
rent). But direct asset ownership by blacks remains relatively small, thus asset income does not 
contribute much to aggregate black incomes. 
Social grants for the black population also expanded through the gradual move towards grant 
equalisation from the mid-1970s – grant values were equalised before the political transition. A 
further  massive  expansion  of  grants  occurred  after  the  turn  of  the  century.  Grants  are  an 
important income source for those who are poorly linked to the labour market. In this manner, 
incomes at the bottom of the distribution could rise despite their benefiting little from market 
trends. Grant spending increased by R600 per capita over the whole population in the last eight 
years, with the effect being larger and concentrated at the bottom of the distribution.  
Given all these factors, income inequality between white and black was reduced, in part because 
some black people benefited from new economic opportunities in the post-transition period. This 
affected income distribution within the black population and gave rise to a growing black middle 
class.  
There have been no reliable estimates of the distribution of wealth (assets) since the pioneering 
work  of  Michael  McGrath  (1983,  1990a,  1990b;  McGrath  &  Whiteford  1994;  Whiteford  & 
McGrath  1994).  As  in  all  societies,  however,  this  distribution  can  be  expected  to  be  more 
unequal than the distribution of income. The propensity to save increases with income, implying 
higher rates of accumulation amongst the more affluent. In addition, wealth, once accumulated, 
is  transmitted  across  generations.  In  South  Africa,  most  black  people  were  prevented  from 
accumulating the most common assets, residential properties, during apartheid. Also, given other 11 
 
immediate priorities, few black people have yet started investing on scale: For instance, only 
0.46% had bought shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 2009, compared to 4.79% of 
whites (own calculations from AMPS data). 
Though  the  rise  of  black  middle  class  has  been  linked  with  affirmative  action  and  black 
economic empowerment policies, it can also be seen as a natural tendency in a modern economy 
in which the black population numerically dominates – the political transition may just have 
accelerated a process already well under way by 1994 (Kane-Berman 1991). It is not possible on 
available information to separate the relative effect on distributional outcomes of natural socio-
economic trends from deliberate government policies to increase black representation in higher 
skilled  occupations  and  industries.  Whatever  the  case,  the  trend  towards  normalisation 
inexorably continued after the transition: The black share of the richest quintile of the population 
rose  substantially,  from  22%  in  1993  to  42%  in  2008  (though  this  remains  far  below  their 
population share). According to AMPS data, the number of black people in households earning 
more than R40 000 per capita in 2000 Rand terms increased from 0.4 million in 1994 to 1.9 
million in 2008, an increase of 1.5 million, while the total population in this group increased by 
only 2.0 million, from 3.2 to 5.2 million. Thus blacks became the largest part of the increment in 
the middle class.  
But  not  all  many  black  members  of  the  middle  class  have  yet  consolidated  their  economic 
position. First generation members of the middle class are often economically relatively insecure 
because they may have few assets and durable consumer goods. This accounts for black middle 
class  consumption  patterns  that  differ  significantly  from  those  of  more  established  middle 
classes. Thus, for instance, rich black households are less likely to own dishwashers or vehicles 
than their counterparts in other race groups, while they are more active purchasers of such goods, 
often spending their discretionary income on accumulating assets and consumer durables. 
Aggregate income distribution and poverty trends  
Recent studies of income distribution have generally analysed data from the 1995, 2000 and 
2005/6 IES household surveys (together with the linked 1995 October Household Survey and 
September 2000 LFS) or income data from the censuses conducted in 1996 and 2001 and the 
Community Survey of 2007. This means that one can consider two roughly similar time periods 
post transition. There is some coherence, but also some disagreement, in the results found for 
these periods. This is partly because measurement errors in surveys are exacerbated when only 
two data points, some years apart and each with its own errors and idiosyncrasies, are compared. 
Most analyses find for the period from the transition to 2000 a moderate to strong rise in overall 
inequality (Statistics South Africa 2002; Hoogeveen and Özler 2006; Van der Berg & Louw 
2004; Simkins 2004; Ardington et al. 2005; Leibbrandt et al. 2006; Yu 2008, 2009, 2010). There 
is broad agreement about the trends, though the levels vary widely, depending on the datasets 
used and the techniques employed to deal with some data and measurement issues. 
Using Sequential Regression Multiple Imputation (SRMI) to impute values for reported zero or 
missing  incomes,  Yu  (2009)  found  a  strong  increase  (seven  or  eight  points)  in  the  Gini 
coefficient between 1996 and 2001 (Table 3). Supporting evidence comes from other studies 12 
 
employing alternative measures: Leibbrandt el al (2006) found an increase in the Gini from 0.68 
to 0.73 using one method, and from 0.74 to 0.79 using another; Simkins (2004) found that the 
Gini coefficient for households grew from 0.66 to 0.69; and Ardington et al (2005) concluded 
that the Gini coefficient rose from 0.74 to 0.82. There is thus agreement about the trends, though 
the levels vary widely.  
Table 3: Gini coefficients, Census / CS vs. IESs 




Per capita income 
(using COICOP 
IES 1995  ..  ..  0.660 
Census 1996  0.734  0.694  .. 
IES 2000  ..  ..  0.709 
Census 2001  0.817  0.756  .. 
IES 2005/2006  ..  ..  0.715 
Community Survey 2007  0.759  0.743  .. 
Note:  IES2005  was  classified  according  to  the new  structure  of  national accounts  of  the  United  Nations.  For 
comparisons  over  time,  re-classification  of  some  items  from  the  old  Standard  Trade  Classification  to  the  new 
COICOP was necessary 
Source: Yu 2009, 44, Table 22 
Inequality at the aggregate level also showed a less clear trend after the turn of the century (Van 
der Berg, Louw & Yu 2008; Van der Berg, Louw & Du Toit 2009; Leibbrandt et al. 2010). 
Between Census 2001 and the Community Survey of 2007, there was either a strong decline in 
the Gini (according to Yu (2009)‟s SRMI1) or more likely, using his more appropriate SRMI2, a 
minor (1 point) decline in the Gini coefficient. The IES implies that a further half a point rise 
took place between 2000 and 2005. Yu‟s careful analysis of the three IES surveys in which he 
strove to obtain comparability in definitions led him to conclude that “…there was an evident 
increase of Gini coefficient between IES1995 and IES2000, while the IES2000 and IES2005 Gini 
coefficient values were very similar, regardless of the income categorization method used.” (Yu 
2008: 20).   
Thus there was probably a strong upward trend in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient 
in the second half of the 1990s, and largely stable inequality since. Inequality is clearly very 
high, but how high is not clear. Various measurement errors may lead to both high incomes and 
low incomes being under-estimated, thus the net effect of mismeasurement on inequality is not 
clear.  Based on available datasets and using comparatively similar methods, Yu  (2008) shows 
Gini coefficient ranging between 0.612 and 0.826 in this period, but  with little trend: Ginis 
simply differ greatly even for the same year, due to data comparability and measurement issues. 
There is less agreement about poverty trends in the period 1995-2000, with anything from a 
strong rise (Leibbrandt, Levisohn and McCrary 2010) to a moderate decline (UNDP 2003; Van 
der Berg & Louw 2004; Van der Berg, Louw & Yu 2008; Leibbrandt et al. 2010) being found. 
The strongest support seems to be for a view that the poverty headcount rose moderately in this 
period (Yu 2008, 2010; Agüero, Carter & May 2005 for Kwazulu-Natal.) 13 
 
Looking at the period after 2000, Van der Berg, Louw & Yu (2006) used less conventional data 
sources (the regular All Media and Products Survey, AMPS) in an attempt at early identification 
of poverty trends for policy purposes. The results of this analysis indicated that poverty declined 
after 2000, driven largely by the expansion of social grants, although increased employment and 
the economic growth which made both employment growth and grant expansion possible also 
contributed. This view has now become the conventional wisdom: Meth (2006) analysed data 
from Labour Force Surveys and also found poverty to have fallen after 2000, although not to the 
same extent.  Agüero, Carter and May (2005) reported that between 1998 and 2004 poverty 
declined  among  black  and  Indian  households  in  KwaZulu-Natal,  although  Leibbrandt  et  al. 
(2010) find no strong downward trend at the national level comparing NIDS (2008) data to 
IES2000.  Supporting  evidence  comes  from  the  GHS  surveys  on  the  prevalence  of  hunger: 
Households reporting that a child went hungry halved between 2002 and 2007, from just over 31 
per cent to 15 per cent, before a slight reversal in 2008 during the recession (Figure 2; see also 
Seekings 2006).  
 
Despite reservations about this data source for income distribution analysis, the poverty trends 
identified by Yu (2010, 26) and shown in Table 4 capture the consensus view for the full post-
transition period, that poverty first increased before it declined (though there is disagreement on 
the magnitude of the trends. The initial rise in poverty is probably due to a combination of 
sluggish economic growth and poor labour market prospects in the second half of the 1990s, 
while the recent decline in poverty resulted from faster economic growth, an improved labour 
market and especially increased social grant spending (Van der Berg, Louw & Du Toit 2009, 21) 
 
Figure 2: Households reporting that children went hungry in the past year 
 
Source: Calculations from General Household Surveys (GHS) 
Households that reported that children went 
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Table 4: Poverty at a poverty line of R2532 per capita per years in 2000 Rand terms based 
on two censuses and the Community Survey 






Black  54.1%  53.8%  39.6% 
Coloured  20.5%  21.0%  15.5% 
Indian  5.4%  5.5%  5.8% 
White  1.8%  1.1%  0.9% 
Total  44.1%  44.6%  32.9% 
Source: Yu 2009: 39 
Inequality within groups versus inequality between groups 
Estimates from varied data sources are in broad agreement that intra-group inequality has been 
rising within all race groups. It is particularly high amongst the black population, but also quite 
high even for the least unequal group, the white population. New opportunities for parts of the 
black  population,  previously  constrained  by  apartheid-era  policies,  stimulated  black  upward 
mobility, while the removal of the protection earlier offered to the white population may have 
caused some downward mobility in parts of this group (Moll 2000). The Gini coefficient is rising 
for all groups separately, but not necessarily for South Africa as a whole, because the major 
component of overall income inequality – inequality between race groups – has been declining.  
The  Theil  index,  which  allows  for  a  decomposition  of inequality  into  a  within-group and  a 
between-group component, shows that while within-group  inequality has  risen, the between-
group inequality component has declined. In other words, inequality is gradually becoming less 
based  on  race,  as  it  declines  between  groups  but  grows  within  groups.  Whereas  61%  of 
inequality in the AMPS data could in 1993 still be ascribed to inequality between groups, that 
proportion has now dwindled to 35%. Results from other datasets confirm this pattern. 
Overall  conclusions  from  the literature on trends  in  poverty  and  income distribution can be 
summarised as in Table 5 and have been well encapsulated by Leibbrandt et al. (2010, 18-19): 
“…there is something of a consensus around the direction of post-Apartheid inequality 
and poverty trends even if there are disagreements about the precise levels at any point 
in time. Aggregate inequality has remained stubbornly high and perhaps even increased. 
This  is  being  driven  by  increasing  intra-race  inequality.  In  the  adjustments  to  South 
African society accompanying the advent of democracy, such dynamism is not unexpected 
and not necessarily bad. However, the fact that the post-Apartheid society started off with 
such a high level of inequality certainly adds an ominous note to this trend. Given the 
skewed  distribution  of  human  and  physical  assets  that  undergirds  these  trends,  it  is 
unsurprising that there has not been a dramatic improvement in money-metric poverty 
over the early years of  the post-Apartheid period. More recent  years have witnessed 
stronger  gains against  poverty.  Indeed, one of  the useful  features of  the interchange 
between Meth and Van der Berg et al. is that it has highlighted the importance of the 
social grant system as a social safety net in South Africa. The importance of the state old 15 
 
age pension has been recognized from the outset of the post-Apartheid period and the 
demonstrable impact of the child support grant in the last six years is notable. This takes 
the aggregate empirical picture a little closer to the real application of post-Apartheid 
policy in South Africa.”  
Table 5: Post-transition trends in poverty and income distribution 
  Approximate time period 
  1994-2000  2000-2006 
Aggregate inequality  Rising strongly  Little change 
Inequality between groups  Declining  Declining 
Inequality within groups  Rising strongly  Rising 
Poverty headcount  Rising moderately  Declining strongly 
 
The centrality of the labour market 
By far the largest share of overall current income derives from labour remuneration, though its 
share has declined from a peak of 81% in 1976 to 63% in 2005, according to South African 
Reserve Bank data. The share of transfer incomes (social grants) is small at almost 7% (though it 
has been rising, from just 3% in 1960) and the residual share has grown a lot since the mid 
1980s,  from  around  20%  to  31%  in  2005. As  residual  (largely  property)  incomes  are  quite 
unequally distributed, their rising share may put upward pressure on inequality.  
Although the Gini-coefficient is not decomposable between groups where incomes overlap, it is 
possible  to  decompose  it  by  income  source.  Such  a  decomposition  often  distinguishes  what 
Leibbrandt,  Bhorat  &  Woolard  (2001:  23)  referred  to  as  “…the  key  labour  market,  asset 
ownership  and  state  welfare  processes  driving  South  Africa’s  inequality”,  viz.  wages,  other 
income (including dividends), and transfers from government. Virtually two-thirds of households 
earn  wage  income,  but  amongst  these  households  the  Gini  coefficient  for  wage  income  in 
IES2005/6 was a very high 0.651. This reflects the great inequality in wage earnings between 
households, because of differences in both wage levels and the number of wage earners. Using 
IES data, differentials in wage earnings per household statistically “explain” 77.9% of overall 
inequality.
9  
Residual income contributes to overall inequality, as one would expect – if this was the only 
source of income, the Gini would have been 0.878. In contrast, government transfers (mainly 
social grants) benefit especially lower income earners. They are only weakly related to overall 
incomes. Social grants reduce poverty – but have virtually no impact on inequality. Armstrong 
and Burger (2009, 17) find that, despite a large impact on poverty, social grants reduced the 
Generalised Entropy measure 2 (half the square of the coefficient of variation) by only 1%. As 
the considerable literature on measuring the impact of social grants (Case & Deaton 1998; Case, 
                                                 
9  Classifying  income  sources  slightly  differently,  Leibbrandt,  Woolard,  Finn  &  Argent  (2010:  34-5)  find  this 
percentage to be 88% in the 1993 PSLSD, 91% in IES2005/6 and 85% using the 2008 NIDS data. 16 
 
Lin  &  McLanahan  1999;  Bertrand,  Miller  &  Mullainathan  2000;  Duflo  2000;  Edmonds, 
Mammen & Miller 2001; Keller 2004; Posel, Fairburn & Lund 2006; Klasen & Woolard 2009) 
has by now well-established, grants have an important economic influence, including possibly 
affecting household formation and composition and migration decisions. 
Decomposition  analysis  shows  that  most  income  inequality  originates  in  the  labour  market, 
through the distribution of jobs and the wage formation processes. Thus change in South African 
inequality must start with a reduction of inequality in wage earnings. If grants have little impact, 
and even assuming that property income does not skew distribution, The high inequality of wage 
earnings effectively sets a floor to aggregate income inequality, while property income further 
increases inequality and social transfers only mildly ameliorate it. Without more equal labour 
market outcomes, aggregate inequality will remain high and will undoubtedly encourage further 
direct labour market interventions in an attempt to affect distributional outcomes. 
Some see more jobs as an answer to this, to give the poor access to income and reduce wage 
earning inequality between households. But that is too simple a solution. A simulation exercise 
using IES2000 data showed that jobs would have a more beneficial effect on poverty than on 
inequality: 2½ million additional jobs would reduce the Gini coefficient by only about 0.033, but 
would reduce the poverty headcount ratio by almost 9 percentage points. In contrast, an average 
wage  increase  of  as  much  as  30%  would  only  reduce  the  poverty  headcount  by  about  4 
percentage points, while leaving the Gini coefficient slightly higher (0.011 points). 
Thus the pattern of wage inequality itself needs to change to really affect aggregate income 
distribution in a major way. The manifestation of wage inequality is a sharply convex returns to 
labour function. This shows evidence of much higher productivity and wages being associated 
with higher levels of educational attainment. This reflects much stronger demand for educated 
than for less educated labour, and perhaps also encapsulates employer preferences for higher 
quality labour. Earnings functions indicate that the unexplained part of earnings differentials 
between race groups remains stubbornly high (Burger & Jafta 2006). This unexplained residual 
is often considered an upper estimate for labour market discrimination, but in South Africa it 
may to a considerable degree result from differences in the quality of education received by 
members of different race groups. Thus educational quality is a central concern in labour market 
outcomes.  
The convex returns to education is evidence of higher productivity being associated with higher 
attainment (Keswell & Poswell 2004; Bhorat & Leibbrandt 2001). The steeply rising slope of 
Mincerain earnings function for South Africa after matric points to a threshold effect – below a 
certain level and quality of education, an additional year of education is not greatly valued in the 
labour market, both in terms of employment probability and in wage earnings.  
Policy and distribution 
The  complexity  of  the  economic  interactions  makes  it  almost  impossible  to  know  the 
distributional outcome of policies. Norman Bromberger (1982, 167) warned that “We must avoid 
assuming that if there is a change, or no change, government policy is responsible. Nor should 17 
 
we  assume  that  government  policies  are  either  coherent  or  necessarily  successful”. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that current racial inequalities still reflect the large shadow of South 
Africa‟s racial history. Two policy issues deserve special mention: government social spending, 
and education.  
Social spending 
Social spending inequalities were substantially reduced from the mid-1970‟s onwards (Van der 
Berg 2001, 2006, 2009b). After the political transition, government social spending per person 
increased in real terms by 21 % from 1995 to 2000 and by a further 40% growth in the first six 
years of this century, and spending also became much better targeted. Social spending is indeed 
now  extremely  well  targeted  to  the  poor  for  a  middle  income  country.  Targeting  occurred 
through the means test for social grants, through the fact that poorer people have more children 
who benefit from public school spending, and because the rich largely avoid using public health 
facilities, leaving a larger share of the benefits (though a poor quality of service) to those who 
cannot  afford  to  vote  with  their  feet  to  avoid  the  public  health  sector.  The  relative  shift  in 
resources towards the best targeted social spending programme, social grants, further improved 
targeting.   
Due to these fiscal shifts there was a large increase in spending on the poorest quintiles, with the 
economically more disadvantaged being the major beneficiaries. While spending per capita on 
whites was almost nine times that on blacks in the mid 1970‟s (R4 795 versus R564, in 2000 
Rand terms), spending per capita on blacks is now almost twice as much as on whites (R3 013 
versus R1 568). (Van der Berg 2009) 
Such massive fiscal redistribution cannot compensate for highly unequal income distribution in 
the  market.  Moreover,  there  are  fiscal  limits  to  redistribution  of  this  nature  and  capacity 
constraints  in  the  state  apparatus  that  limit  the  felt  benefits  from  such  redistribution,  as  the 
quality of government services is often poor. This is well illustrated in the field of education. 
Education 
Despite apartheid-era policies, a dramatic expansion of education took place long before the 
political transition. This led to a remarkable narrowing of the gap in years of education attained 
(Figure 3). (Van der Berg 2007, 2009a). In an international context, the progress of successive 
black cohorts in attaining more years of education completed was spectacular, as the comparison 
in the Figure with data for three other developing countries shows. Lam (1999) also illustrated 
this in a comparison of educational attainment in South Africa and Brazil. 
But  education  levels  below  matric  contribute  relatively  little  to  improving  labour  market 
outcomes. Some two-thirds of the white matric-aged cohort complete matric, versus just over 
one-quarter of the black cohort. Especially amongst the young, many not completing high school 
are  effectively  excluded  from  the  economic  mainstream,  given  the  way  the  labour  market 
interprets  educational  attainment.  If  educational  quality  is  considered,  differences  are  even 
larger, as access to quality education remains highly skewed. While black children in 2007 were 
83% of the matric-aged cohort and already constituted 78% of matric passes in public schools, 18 
 
they accounted for only 59% of the endorsements (“university exemptions”), for 34% of those 
who passed Mathematics at the Higher Grade  with an A, B or C aggregate (i.e. those who can 
potentially continue onto university further studies in engineering, medicine, science or even 
commerce), and for only 14% of those who passed matric with an A aggregate.
10  
Figure 3: Educational attainment (years of education completed) by birth cohort and race, 
with  comparisons to some other middle-income developing countries 
 
Source: Own calculations from Community Survey 2007 and World Bank‟s Edustats. 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
This paper has discussed the quantitative dimensions of poverty and income distribution in South 
Africa. Severe data quality and measurement issues make strong statements on trends income 
inequality difficult to substantiate. Nevertheless, a few conclusions can be drawn: 
  The  relationship  between  poverty  and  inequality  is  not  straightforward;  poverty  can 
indeed  decline  while  inequality  grows,  but  rising  inequality  can  also  dominate  any 
beneficial impacts of economic growth on poverty. Poverty alleviation must be higher on 
the policy agenda than reducing inequality, though South African history makes attention 
to inter-racial equity an important concern in its own right.  
                                                 

















































































































  Sustained economic growth since the political transition allowed more attention to be 
paid to poverty alleviation, with some success: Social grants were successful in the period 
after 2000 in considerably reducing money-metric poverty. 
  However, overall inequality has not improved and remains extremely high. But its nature 
has  changed:  Inter-racial  (between-group)  income  distribution  improved  considerably, 
but income distribution within groups worsened. Thus the racial dimension of inequality 
has been softened.  
  Growing inequality within the black population is also associated with rapid growth of 
the black middle class, a rise too rapid and large to be ascribed to BEE policies alone.  
  However, comparability issues between data sources and the difficulty of capturing some 
sources of income well (such as dividends) cast some doubt on these conclusions, as do 
the large and inexplicable differences in levels of Gini coefficients as determined using 
different data sources, even for the same period.  
  Decomposition of inequality by income source shows that wage income is the dominant 
component in overall income inequality. To a large extent wage inequality derives from 
differences in both educational levels and educational quality. 
Fiscal  redistribution  through  the  grant  system  has  had  some  success  in  reducing  poverty. 
However,  fiscal  and  state  capacity  sets  limits  to  such  redistribution  and  makes  this  an 
inauspicious tool for future change. The fiscal capacity constraint arises from the fact that grant 
spending already constitutes a high proportion of GDP and that such grants need to compete with 
other public spending. The state capacity constraint relates to the fact that social delivery has 
been greatly  constrained by the limited ability  of the public sector to convert spending into 
improved  outcomes  for  the  poor.  Transfers  also  cannot  really  affect  inequality  much.  Their 
overall  magnitude  is  too  small,  even  in  South  Africa,  to  have  a  great  effect  on  inequality 
measures, despite good targeting.  
Job creation, though crucial for poverty reduction, will also do little to reduce overall inequality. 
The weak endowments of those currently unemployed would not assure them of high labour 
market earning. Thus even if they were employed, it would probably be at low wages, thus 
leaving wage and hence aggregate inequality high and little affected. In the absence of improved 
education,  direct  interventions  to  artificially  change  labour  market  outcomes  also  hold  little 
prospect of improving poverty and distribution and may reduce the efficient functioning of the 
labour market, with various possible side-effects.  
Thus the labour market is at the heart of inequality, and central to labour market inequality is the 
quality of education. To reduce income inequality substantially requires a different wage pattern 
based on better human capital for the bulk of the population. Prospects for this at present appear 
inauspicious. 
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